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In this End of Mater Project, we analyse the most relevant empirical and theoretical 
papers and main ideas behind them. Following academic work made us understand 
what is the role of accounting information in the improvement of debt contracting and 
how it achieved this, among different mechanisms. Here we are focusing our 
attention on two different theories, The Agency theory and The Incomplete contract 
theory. We consider really important the differences between two of them and how 
they, together, influence contract making. Furthermore, we base our analysis on 
different type of covenants included in both theories, as well as on the impact of 
accounting conservatism to risk reduction or at least risk perception. Finally, we 
explain importance of existence of renegotiation process both, ex-post and ex-ante. 
All this in order to understand how debt covenants are made, why lenders rely on 
them and why in different case scenarios they play completely different role. 
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For the last centuries people and companies were trying to ensure deals in writing. 
Contracts are the usual way of protection when doing business. They have changed 
over the years, have been improved and nowadays they include some mechanisms 
that increase their efficiency. One of these mechanisms are covenants representing 
restrictions that usually rely on the borrowers´ accounting information. Today’s debt 
contracts usually rely on covenants, almost 90% of these kind of contracts in the US 
between 1995 and 2005 included 1 or more of them (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). This 
can give us an idea of the importance of covenants in contract theory and that is why 
we are interested in how covenants, hand in hand with accounting information, 
increase the efficiency of debt contracts.  
In this End of Mater Project, we analyse the most relevant empirical and theoretical 
papers and main ideas behind them. Following academic work made us understand 
what is the role of accounting information in the improvement of debt contracting and 
how it achieved this, among different mechanisms. 
In the second section we present two theories that explain how accounting-based 
covenants increase the efficiency of debt contracting. The first one is the Agency 
Theory, which claims that accounting based covenants decrease the agency costs 
by aligning the conflict of interest arisen between borrowers and lenders. On the 
other hand, there is the Incomplete Contract Theory that claims existence of a scope 
for opportunistic behaviour after the debt is issued, due to the incompleteness of 
contracts.4 Opportunistic behaviour means that the company manager can act on 
behalf the stockholders in detriment of debtholders welfare.  Both theories are 
complementary because they have different approaches to the problem, giving a 
wider understanding of the role of accounting information in the improvement of the 
efficiency of debt contracting. We also discuss the point of view of both theories 
when different problems arise. Following, we present the role of accounting 
conservatism in the efficiency of debt contracting. Accounting conservatism has an 
                                                        
4 A contract is incomplete when it cannot foresee the different states of the world within it. 
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important role in debt contracting as it can show the real state of nature of the 
borrower, reflecting then the exact credit risk of the borrower (known as contractibility 
of accounting information). 
Section three is reserved for the summary of the other main papers used for the 
purpose of writing this End of Master Project. The idea with it is to give a wider view 
of resources and ideas we had while writing it. Even though those are not all papers 
used, we thought they represent core stones of our research and we wanted to 
present two different things. In first place, having discussions about development of 
debt covenants throughout history and on the other, talking about renegotiation in a 
case that debt contract is not ex-ante efficient (before the debt is issued). After 
discussing two mentioned theories we focus on impact of accounting conservatism 
in debt contracting. Realizing how important conservatism is for lenders, especially 
if it has been used for the years. Later on we want to emphasize existence of different 
types of covenants used and how their presence lowers the risk of lenders. Moreover, 
we highlight reasons for taking into account public not private loans. This way we 
rounded the first part of our research and then we move to renegotiation as the other 
way of solving possible disagreements.  
In the last section we point out to main unanswered questions already mentioned 
throughout the paper. Besides, we try to demonstrate our point of view based on the 
research we’ve done. This all, according to the literature used and quantitative 
research they have shown in the papers. 
 
 The Agency and The Incomplete Contract Theories, and the Role of 
Accounting Information in Debt Contracting 
 
2.1. The Agency Theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency relationship as a contract arranged by 
a person called “the principal” (can be seen as the owners of a company), with 
another person called “the agent” (can be seen as the top managers of a company), 
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to perform a couple of activities that involve giving decision making authority to the 
agent. As people are rational individuals, according to the economic theory they are 
utility maximisers, there are reasons to think that the agent is going to pursue his 
own interest, which in some cases is going against the principal’s interests. In order 
to prevent this and to ensure that the agent is going to take decisions that benefit 
the principal, the principal has to give incentives and also has to incur in some costs, 
called agency costs as follows: 
1. The monitoring expenditures by the principal, through budget restrictions, 
compensation policies, among others; 
2. The bonding expenditures by the agent; 
3. The residual loss, defined as the loss in the principal’s welfare caused by 
some decisions taken by the agent. 
The agency relationship can be extent to the relationship of an owner manager of a 
firm (as the agent) and the outside shareholders (as the principals). After providing 
financing, as outside shareholders bear a portion of the costs arisen due to owner-
manager’s decisions, the owner-manager losses incentives to follow unproductive 
activities, arising agency costs. As portion of the company’s ownership of outside 
shareholders’ increase compared to the owner-manager’s ownership, the agency 
costs increase for the outside shareholders.  
In order to mitigate the agency costs arisen in outside equity financing, company 
may rely on debt financing rather than outside equity financing. As debt financing is 
a fixed claim (equity is not a fixed claim) the owner-manager internalizes the cost 
and benefits of his actions, gaining the proper incentives, but he also gets incentives 
to invest in riskier projects even though knowing this could destroy company’s value 
(this is known as asset substitution). This can be explained by point of view where 
equity claims can be seen as call options in the company’s assets, where if the payoff 
is positive the owner manager is getting all the profits, but if the payoff is negative 
the losses are going to be transferred to the debtholders who are going to bear them. 
As the portion of debt financing increases respect to the portion of equity financing 
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within the company, the owner-manager is going to have higher incentives to take 
more risk (Christensen, Nikolaev and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2016). 
The conflict of interest arisen between debtholders and equity holders leads to other 
agency costs, such as (Jensen and Meckling, 1976): 
1. The opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact of debt on the investment 
decisions of the firm; 
2. The bonding and monitoring expenditures incurred by both the owner-
manager and the debtholders; 
3. The reorganization and bankruptcy costs.  
The optimal combination of the capital structure of a company is given when the 
marginal agency costs of equity equal the marginal costs of debt. As outside 
shareholders and debtholders are rational investors, they discount the agency cost 
arisen, so the owner-manager is the one that carry them. As a result of this, the 
owner-manager needs a mechanism, such as issuing debt with a set of covenants, 
which makes him have more incentives to hurt less the welfare of both, debtholders 
and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
It is important to highlight the role of accounting information: it enhances debt 
contracting efficiency by minimizing agency costs (i.e. contracting costs). This is, 
managers are enforced by covenants not to take some actions included in debt 
contracts. Here is not about allocation of the decision rights but about vetoing 
possibly harmful decisions when certain conditions are met. It is usually that 
conditions, set as triggers, are the ones to show potential crisis existence or 
probability. Prevention comes in the form of debt covenants and it appears to restrict 
actions that can lead to additional costs. Those managerial actions are the ones that 
can make debtholders lose value of their debt securities in the company. Covenants 
usually rely on accounting information, restricting dividend payments, investment 
activities, the possibility of issuing new debt, among others. The idea behind, is that 
owner-manager’s decisions will be influenced through incentives or strict limitations 
after debt is issued. (Christensen et al., 2016). 
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In some cases, covenants can limit the owner-manager to take optimal actions, 
leading to reduction of the profitability of the company, affecting then future cash 
flows and the value of the owner-manager’s claims. This, added to the cost involved 
in subscribing covenants and making the owner-manager to comply with them are 
considered as monitoring costs. As we explained before, debtholders don’t carry 
agency costs, but the owner-manager do, therefore, he has to assure that these 
costs are the lowest possible (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
One more reason to choose mostly accounting information as the base for covenants 
lies in their conservatism. Based on timely loss recognition, impairment principle and 
lots others, they assure the lowest value of the assets and highest value of liabilities, 
allowing bad state to be spotted as soon as possible. To one, this might seem 
insignificant, but it reduces worries and therefore costs, especially in debt contracts. 
Since in Europe debtors are mostly banks, which are conservative by nature, 
importance of having conservative numbers in the book increases. Despite of this, 
as it can be seen later in the paper, they require less covenants than in public debt 
contracts. This is because they can acquire all information immediately and directly 
from the board of directors and not relying on the public information provided by 
company. 
If project is profitable performance covenants won’t apply since they are supposed 
to early indicate and prevent crisis, if everything is going as planned there is no 
reason to prevent managers from taking actions, as they consider them the right 
ones. On the other hand, capital covenants will prevent shareholders to reduce level 
of equity, even though project is profitable. As measure of precaution these 
covenants forbid lowering equity below some point (regardless of the state in which 
company is in). In good state, this prevents them from extracting the equity for their 
sake, and in bad state it means they will not be able to invest in bad projects or 
withdraw their part after certain conditions are met.  
The agency theory is still not able to answer all questions arisen in practice, which 
means that there is a lot more research that has to be done.  For instance, the 
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agency theory does not consider the role of decision rights, which make come up 
some questions that are not answer by this theory (Christensen et al., 2016):   
1. Why do many debt contracts include relatively few covenants? Considering 
the agency theory perspective, it is expected that a debt contract should 
incorporate lots of covenants combined with multiple performance indicators; 
2. Covenants are renegotiated usually in situations different to financial 
distressed situations, leading to ask: what is the purpose of committing to 
covenants if they are being renegotiated later; 
3. Why do lenders actively participate in companies’ governance by influencing 
investing and financing decisions or even though by replacing the companies’ 
managers; 
4. Financial covenants don’t seem to align directly both shareholders and 
debtholders interests because covenants are frequently renegotiated, this 
goes against the initial purpose of committing to them. 
Meanwhile, there is the incomplete contract theory, which covers some issues 
questioned that are not answered by the agency theory. This theory allows us to get 
better understanding of the topic and why covenants and accounting information are 
so important in debt contracting. This doesn’t mean that one is more useful than 
other; it just means that one has another approach to the problem, giving us a wider 
view of it. That’s why we see them as complementary theories. We will now focus 
on the incomplete contract theory and the questions it covers.  
 
2.2. The incomplete contract theory 
 
An incomplete contract is the one that, in the moment it was signed (ex-ante), it is 
not able reflect every possible state of nature and every possible decision a manager 
can make in the future, and also there are things that are contained in the contract 
that might not be enforceable because they cannot be verified by a third party. This 
can be explained due to the high costs of making contract to reflect all possible 
scenarios above (Christensen et al., 2016).   
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Coase (1937) argued that prices and contracts are costly to rely on in order to 
coordinate some economic activities. This is due to the need of price discovery and 
the need of comprehensive long-term contracts negotiation, which can be, both, time 
consuming and costly. He also argued that long term contracts can only establish 
the limits of what is expected from both parties to do or restrain from doing. Left to 
clarify in the future are exact details of acceptable behaviour. Other authors such as 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) claim that after a deal is closed, opportunistic 
behaviour arise between the both parties, leaving just 2 mechanisms that prevent 
this it: 
1. Contracting - more expensive than vertical integration and “a contract 
therefore may be clearly enforceable but still subject to post-contractual 
opportunistic behaviour” (Klein, Crawford and Alchian ,1978; page 301); 
2. Vertical integration – referring to strategy of acquiring businesses within the 
same production vertical (backward or forward). It can help reducing the costs 
and improving efficiency. However, sometimes, because of job delicacy it is 
better to rely on known sources then to acquire other businesses and 
managing them without required know-how. 
In extension to the previous theories, Groosman and Hart (1986) argued that as it is 
usually expensive to specify certain actions in a contract and that’s better for one 
party to purchase all rights, but only those which are written in the contract. The 
purchase of those remaining control rights is meant as “ownership”. They conclude 
that “ex-ante efficiency of the relationship between 2 parties will depend on how 
residual rights of control are allocated. […] the incompleteness of a contract is the 
source of our conclusion that the distribution of property rights has efficiency 
consequences” (Groosman and Hart, 1986; page 718).  
The incomplete contract theory mainly focuses on economic benefits of one party to 
sell the control rights to other. By assigning this control rights to the party with right 
incentives problem can be solved, translating into a complete contract. In line with 
Coase (1937), as the contract cannot reflect every possible scenario, the future 
contingencies are yet to be determined and they will be taken into account during 
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renegotiation process. Thus, contracts may consider the way to allocate control 
rights when there are different possible scenarios in future which are not taken into 
account.  The main problem of the incomplete contract theory is when, due to the 
incompleteness of a contract, an opportunistic behaviour arises. This problem is 
known as hold-up problem (Christensen et al., 2016). It arises when one party 
(manufacturer) makes a big sunk investment and enter in a negotiation with another 
party (trader) to trade their products. The trader gets bargaining power due to the 
need of the manufacturer to recover and get profits on the investment he just made. 
Due to this higher bargaining power, the trader can benefit by appropriating some 
gains from the manufacturer, arising a distortion of the investment incentives of the 
manufacturer (Hermalin and Katz, 2009). This can be seen as an opportunistic 
behaviour of the trader, who is expropriating rent from the manufacturer, which make 
place for the scope of opportunistic renegotiation to appear (Christensen et al., 2016). 
According to Christensen et al. (2016), the hold-up problem can be extent to debt 
contracts, where the borrower threatens the lender with the idea of going into a high 
risky project (that was known by the lender) after the debt was issued. Due to this, 
the borrower assures existence of renegotiation process of debt conditions as well 
as his position in it (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). On the other hand, a lender can 
threaten to recall debt earlier, before the project has been done (Sharpe, 1990). 
Therefore, the hold-up problem can be mitigated by assigning control rights to the 
party that is subject to create higher value (Christensen et al., 2016). 
Zender (1991) claimed that when liquidation is efficient, creditors are supposed to 
take over control. In this case, ex ante influence is not obtained by contract design, 
but with possibility of shifting control rights. Efficiency is determined by ability to 
allocate control to one that has the best incentives. Shareholders usually have the 
highest incentives to maximize value because they are receivers of the last resort, 
nonetheless it might be the case that, at some point, someone else is better to take 
the power. 
Huberman and Kahn (1988) emphasize both, ex ante and ex post importance of 
contractual clauses because they influence renegotiation. These clauses that shift 
 13 
the power shape the renegotiation outcome in future and improve ex-ante incentives. 
Thereby, renegotiations are sort of threat for managers to behave. 
Usage of accounting information is completely different than in the agency theory. 
Here they refer to new, upcoming information that will change how things should be 
done and were inaccessible at the point of making the contract. Therefore, they will, 
at some point, be incomplete and that incompleteness will lead to deadweight losses. 
Basic idea lies in determining when new state occurs, which is not covered by 
primary contract. To do so, they use accounting-based covenants. Now, as 
previously mentioned, someone could ask why they don’t use market mechanism 
such as prices and contracts. According to Christensen et al. (2016), Coase (1937) 
ague that they are costly because prices have to be discovered and contracts 
negotiated. Moreover, the same opportunistic behaviour incentives could lead to 
contract incompleteness on purpose. This means that they allocate control rights to 
one that has right incentives, but without saying which action should be taken. When 
threshold is breached allocation of control takes place, and those financial covenants 
are showing the state of the world of borrower. Further renegotiation relies on 
covenant that has been breached more than on initial contract. This allows increase 
of bargaining power of damaged party and will assure that, in future, conditions are 
met in a sense that interest of all stakeholders are followed and for value to be 
maximised. 
On the other hand, monetary incentive schemes are not considered enough in this 
framework, cash flow and decision rights are used to complement it. This could be 
because sometimes is way more efficient to allocate decision rights and then make 
proper incentives for managers through salary and bonuses.  
 
2.3. Comparison and discussion 
 
A project depends on the decision-making of an entrepreneur and future state of 
economy, both of them are non-observable. Entrepreneur cares about monetary and 
private benefits, while investor cares only about monetary benefits. Private benefits 
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can be all different, non-monetary compensations, which add value for entrepreneur 
and for investor could be completely useless. Since it is impossible for entrepreneur 
to internalize all costs and benefits due to the fact that investor has to earn something, 
this problem has to be solved differently. In the papers, there are two solutions 
proposed: 
1. Make a contract in a way to align incentives of both, however this would be 
quite costly; 
2. Division of control and cash flow rights as separate contracting instruments – 
when one doesn’t work, apply the other.  
Both theories deal with how to protect stakeholders’ rights and the value of their 
investment, but they are looking at the problem from different perspective and 
therefore they offer different solutions. As previously mentioned, they go from 
preventing managers from taking unwanted actions through shifting control rights to 
other parties, but all with the same goal – protect stakeholders and value of their 
stakes. To do so, they have to cope with different mechanisms and to find a way 
around to handle all possible problems that might occur meanwhile. That being said, 
we must not consider them competitive or sufficient on their own because only with 
combination of two we will be able to see the full picture and determine what the best 
choice is in order to preserve the value. 
Christensen et al. (2016), distinguish on how both theories address contracting 
problems: 
a. Control rights vs Incentive schemes 
When talking about the incomplete contract theory it is very important to 
understand how control rights influence incentive schemes because, as indicated 
before, they will have enormous impact on the decision-making process. Their 
actions will determine the way of handling problems and which investments are 
undertaken. This will further generate costs. For them to exist, ineffective 
activities have to be done. There are two ways of ineffective activities: observable 
and unobservable. With observables is not a problem since they can be 
penalized or forbidden. We can pay managers by their performance if their 
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actions are observable, therefore they will have to pay attention on how they act 
and costs will automatically be reduced, for some portion at least. Others are not 
so easy to spot, thus might be included through incentive schemes. This partially 
aligns interests of managers by tying their monetary compensation with firms’ 
performance. Problem occurs when it is not observable how hard agent works 
and if he has been unlucky or not, if any of those is observable problem will not 
exist. Covenants that have been used to resolve the problem of unobservability, 
such as restriction of dividend pay-out, are accounting-based. This being said, 
one can see the importance of accounting-based information.  
 
b. Covenants and lender opportunity 
Agency costs could occur due to actions of all stakeholders, not only tied to 
managerial actions. Opinion in academic papers is that both, lender and borrower 
can behave opportunistically when they have decision rights. Accordingly, 
lenders´ opportunism is as big concern. For example, if debtholders have control 
rights, they will have incentive to act in a way to repay the debt as soon as 
possible and some project with positive NPV might won´t be undertaken. It would 
be even more expressed than in debt overhang problem. Consequently, it has to 
be considered when making decisions about power allocation, but it is not given 
any attention in the agency costs theory due to impossibility of decision power 
shifting. They are more focused on borrowers’ opportunism which could be easily 
solved by giving lenders full power, if they were not to act with any bias. Inasmuch 
as highly unlikely for them to act without bias, we can conclude this represents 
one of the problems for the theory. Dealing with things of this importance and 
missing one of the main parts has to be mentioned and solved in some way. On 
the other hand, the incomplete contract theory is to address both opportunistic 
behaviours. This is demonstrated in power shifting according to the one with the 
most appropriate incentives. Therefore, we could say that this problem occurring 
in one is not occurring in the other theory. However, that doesn’t mean that one 
is better or flawless, it just means that this part is covered in more efficient way 
in the incomplete contract theory as opposed to agency costs theory. 
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c. Control renegotiations 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) don’t consider it, even though it has quite an 
important role. Without existence of renegotiations it would be silly talking about 
agency theory at all since they solve debt overhang problem via ex-post 
renegotiation. If thinking about the incomplete contract theory it is even more 
straight forward how important renegotiation is. 
After going through all aspects that agency theory covers, we have to take into 
consideration flaws that one has, otherwise we would not be able to fully understand 
and explain the theory itself and its usefulness. Namely, some questions are left 
unanswered. Firstly, why do many debt contracts include relatively few covenants? 
Accounting based covenants are frequently renegotiated outside financial distress, 
leading to following question. What is the value of committing to a covenant if the 
covenant is subsequently renegotiated? Third, why do lenders actively participate in 
firm governance by influencing investment and financing decisions or even by 
replacing the management? Finally, it is difficult to understand the purpose of some 
financial covenants that don’t appear to directly limit or incentivize the borrower’s 
actions but require adherence to pre-specified performance thresholds (Christensen 
et al., 2016; page 403). Again, we see that the incomplete contract theory covers 
this part more carefully. This is due to importance of renegotiations in this theory, 
otherwise, it wouldn’t have the basis to exist.  
 
2.4. Accounting conservatism and its importance 
 
As it was mentioned before, control rights allocation is the first-choice solution 
according to incomplete contract theory, because future renegotiations will go in 
favour of stronger party, giving it more bargaining power. They consider them as ex-
ante efficient. Only because of knowledge of them shifting, one who has it will act in 
the best interest of all parties. Accounting information is really important in this case 
because it shows when control rights should be shifted according to underlying state 
of nature of borrower. As a result of its conservatism and prudence it will show bad 
state sooner than some other indicators. GAAP and IFRS allow some flexibility in 
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showing the data and it’s up to manager to choose in which way it will present 
information and how conservative it will be, but once chosen it should be maintained 
because otherwise will have bad reputation implications. Here, again, conservative 
option has its importance because the more conservative the books of some 
company are, the more confidence public has about their whereabouts and their 
actions.  
 
3. Prior Related Empirical Literature 
 
In this section we want to discuss three different papers we mainly used for the 
researching of this topic. In order to show most recent, relevant data and to present 
our view and conclusions about accounting information and debt covenants we had 
to go deeper into the topic, reading more than these three documents with the idea 
of getting a wider understanding, but our main focus was in those 3 papers. We 
consider them core stones of our research and the main ideas showed in this paper 
come from them. First we will talk about two closely related papers “Debt covenants 
and accounting conservatism” by Nikolaev (2010) and “Capital versus performance 
covenants in debt contracts” by Christensen, H. and Nikolaev, V. (2012). They are 
mainly focused on how covenants influence debt contracts and what information do 
they take into account and why is, indeed, their importance in debt contracting. 
Third paper is somehow different, looking on another aspect of the problem which is 
renegotiation of financial contracts. How does renegotiation work in real life, what 
are the advantages and disadvantages of it? Paper mentioned is “Renegotiation of 
financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements” by Roberts, M. and 
Sufi, A. (2009). 
We will present summary of the 3 previously mentioned papers, from the point of 
view to refer to what we are writing. It can be seen, later on, that majority of data 
used is from the US and this is due to availability of it.  Namely, in the US, companies 
are enforced by law to publish in their annual reports what are the conditions that 
their debt contracts rely on, including the covenants their debt contracts are based 
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on. That is the main reason why this information is easily accessible. On the other 
hand, there is no such regulation in Europe so all the data collected is not perfectly 
reliable at all.  
In this part we want to make clear distinction between private and public debt and 
their usage. We want to show of which importance is for choosing covenants and 
how lenders decide whom to give benefits when lending and in which to include strict 
rules.  
Finally, the data provided in each paper shows the same thing. Having private or 
public debt will certainly determine number and how strict are the covenants included. 
Moreover, it will show the type of covenants used in debt contracts and its influence. 
The last but not the least, it will demonstrate how renegotiation influence contract 
making and whether it reduces the risk within contracts. 
 
3.1. Debt covenants and accounting conservatism, Nikolaev (2010), Journal 
of Accounting Research 
 
The author tests whether firms that rely on covenants in their public debt contracts 
recognize economic losses in earnings faster, meaning whether they are more 
conservative. He followed Basu (1997) in order to measure the timely loss 
recognition as the degree of recognition of losses over economic gains and is basing 
his testing on the sample of 5000 public debt contracts. Main question is whether 
that influence the way they recognize economic losses in accounting earnings. It is 
important because from it depends how and when covenants will apply. Conclusion 
is that existence of covenants is positively related with timely loss recognition. With 
this we think about how conservative firm is and whether that depends on public debt 
it has. 
The first thing to be noticed is that focus is on public, not private debt in his sample. 
This can be explained by what he said in the paper about banks already monitoring, 
while on public market bondholders have troubles obtaining inside information on 
time. This especially due to the lack of monitoring incentives. Private debts are 
stricter when it comes to financial ratios than the public ones. Moreover, private 
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debts are looking for monthly compliance while public ones require yearly time frame. 
Therefore, public debtors will have higher need for making strict covenants, based 
on conservatism and including them into contracts. As already mentioned, 
covenants are there to prevent managers to take decisions that go against debt 
holders and for this to be possible it is important for accounting system to recognize 
potential problems as soon as possible. Even though it is not to expect that all 
problems will disappear with existence of covenants, it is more likely that managers 
will behave more than they would without them. This especially applies to distress 
times, where timely loss recognition is supposed to improve efficiency of covenants. 
Importance of timely loss recognition can also be seen before getting into distressed 
situation because, if used, it provides good reputation and allows easier access to 
public debt market. Hand in hand with it goes threat of litigation, since auditors are 
obliged to check compliance with the covenants they are more open to litigation and 
therefore they will be more cautious. So, as already stated, there are 2 reasons 
behind the increase of the demand for timely loss recognition: 
1. Good reputation for easy access to public markets (Diamond, 1991), the 
untimely recognition of losses tarnishes the reputation of the company in the 
credit markets, affecting the ability of the company to look for resources in the 
debt markets in the future. Thus, company will not have the incentives to 
demand timely loss recognition if the firm is not in trouble (Fehr, Brown and 
Zehnder, 2009); 
2. Timely loss recognition is influenced by the threat of litigation (Basu, 1997). 
Litigation threat arises when a company is approaching a default situation 
(Lys and Watts, 1994) and the failure of the company’s ability to disclose the 
bad news increase its legal liability (Skinner, 1997), and as the company´s 
auditor is often required to comply with a report statement that certifies that 
covenants weren´t violated, it exposes him to risk. Thus, debt contract that 
relies on accounting covenants makes the auditor to be more conservative. 
To emphasize the importance of taking into account public, not private debt, the 
authors highlight three economic differences between private and public debt:  
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1.  Covenants in private debt are stricter compared to public debt, this means 
that covenant violations are more common, leading a renegotiation of them, 
which make the private lender having even more control over the company’s 
decision, reducing then the risk of expropriation of debtholders’ wealth; 
2.  Public debt has a range of negative covenants that rely on accounting 
information. This is explained by the high cost of a renegotiation due to 
violation of covenants, given by the high number of debt holders; 
3. Private debt contracts usually require quarterly or even monthly compulsory 
covenants compliance, while public debt contracts require annual compliance. 
This allow managers to have longer period to act in an opportunistic way 
before anyone is able to obtain already existing information. 
Things above suggest that public debt holders may be more concerned about the 
degree of timely loss recognition than private debt holders, thus in bigger need of 
covenants to protect them. Therefore, more important for the survey to show how 
important timely loss recognition is for them. Accordingly, however helpful the 
covenants are in more than one way, one has to pay attention to trade-off between 
costs and benefits of using them. 
Moreover, the author emphasize how timely loss recognition can improve the 
efficiency of debt contracting: 
1.  Makes easier transfer of decision rights to debtholders; 
2. Makes the signal role of covenants to be spotted easier. 
This because when company approaches distressed situation, timely loss 
recognition makes an early transfer of key control decisions to bondholders (or 
prevents managers from taking some actions, depending of which theory framework 
we are in). This becomes more important when the debt contract relies on covenants. 
About main hypotheses in his paper, we can distinguish more than mentioned below, 
but for the purpose of our research we will focus only on two: 
- H1: Timely recognition of economic losses increases with the use of debt 
covenants in public debt contracts; 
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- H2: Companies that rely on debt covenants more extensively exhibit a greater 
increase in timely recognition of economic losses following debt issue. 
In order to test the relationship between covenants and the degree of timely loss 
recognition, he followed Basu (1997) and measured the accounting conservatism 
allowing the degree of covenants used to influence the effect of bad news on 
earnings. Both models below use 10 year rolling window that takes the prior 5 years 
before the debt issue and the following 5 years after the debt issue. 
 He estimated the following regression (1):  
𝐸𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽0 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 <
0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡(1) 
Where, 
1. Et - year t earnings, Pt–1 is the market value of equity at the end of year t–1; 
2.    Rett - the annual return; 
3.    D(.) - an indicator function: taking value of one when its argument is true, 
and zero otherwise; 
4. Restricts - denotes one of the covenant indices (for a debt contract s) described 
above.  
He constructed an index to quantify the reliance of the public debt to a certain type 
of covenant, he divided it in 5 types of covenants: Pay-out related restrictions, 
investment related restrictions, financing related restrictions, accounting related 
covenants, other covenants. Of primary interest is the coefficient β3, which is 
expected to be positive under hypothesis H1. β3 represents covenant intensity on 






Table 1: Debt covenants and accounting conservatism 
 
Source: Nikolaev (2010), page 151 
 
Here we pay the most attention to an overall index α3 and β3.  
To test hypothesis H2, the author augments equation (1) to allow the coefficient β3 
to take different values before and after the debt issue. The association between 
covenants and timely loss recognition thereby can vary in a post-issue period. In 
order to test that he estimated the following regression (2) 
𝐸𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽0 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 <
0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + ϒ0 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + ϒ1 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡  (2) 
 
Where, After is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in years following the 
debt issue and zero otherwise, and the other variables are the same as in the 
equation (1). Under the second hypothesis, the coefficient β1 is expected to be 
significantly positive. 
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Among a database of 205,000 debt issues by 10,900 companies, between 1980 and 
2006, he took out from the sample non-industrial companies (including banks and 
financial institutions), leaving the sample with 27,771 issues by 6,158 firms. From 
those issues, only 7,956 have covenant information available. Taking just 1 issue 
per firm per year, the author got a final sample of 5,420 issues by 2,466 companies. 
In the first regression he found that the coefficient α3 is positive and significant, in 
accordance to what Basu (1997) found, he found that adding 10 covenants to a debt 
contract results in an increase in timely loss recognition of 0.15. Taking 
independently the payout related restriction group (with the highest effect), the 
investment related restriction group and the financing related restriction group have 
positive and significant association with timely loss recognition. 
Timely loss recognition increases in the accounting related group. Overall, the 
evidence supports hypothesis H1 across different types of covenants. 
Under H2, firms that use covenants more extensively should exhibit a larger increase 
in timely loss recognition, and the other way around as well. 
In the other hypothesis, which not presented here, the author found that the 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant across all 4 specifications, 
meaning that the association between public debt covenants and timely loss 
recognition decrease by the extent to which companies rely on private debt or its 
covenants. 
Furthermore, as the benefits of timely loss recognition are not limited only to 
distressed situations (Watts, 2003), timely loss recognition and debt covenants 






Table 2: Debt covenants and accounting conservatism 
 
Source: Nikolaev (2010), page 153 
 
Here we pay attention to β3 and the last parameter because it shows positive 
correlation among reputation in public sector after signing the debt. 
To conclude, we want to say that there is an obvious relation between timely loss 
recognition and amount/strictness of the covenants. Since timely loss recognition 
helps preventing opportunistic behaviour through triggering existing covenants it can 
be said that lenders would prefer or even require from borrowers to be conservative. 
And in this manner we continue with following papers regarding this topic, now 
focusing our attention to difference in covenants applied. 
 
3.2. Capital versus performance covenants in debt contracts, Christensen, 
H. and Nikolaev, V. (2012), Journal of Accounting Research 
 
The classic view of debt covenants was proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Warner (1979) suggest that covenants are useful to control agency problems by 
restricting manager’s decisions. Recent analytical literature, proposed by Berlin and 
Mester (1992), Rajan and Winton (1995), among others, suggest that covenants are 
trip wires that give to the lenders the option to renegotiate loan terms by threatening 
the company with default due to a deterioration in the company´s performance. 
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There is almost no literature that work on the structure of covenant packages or the 
trade-offs among financial ratios. There are 3 questions that are still not answer yet: 
1. What determines the design of covenant packages?  
2. Do covenants based on different accounting ratios reduce agency costs 
through different mechanisms? 
3. How do the properties of the accounting system influence the choice of 
covenants? 
They developed 2 empirical predictions to test the arguments above, the choice 
between capital or performance covenants is reduced to a cost benefit analysis of 
both type of covenants mechanisms though which contracts address the agency 
problems. The use of capital covenants requires to keep a high proportion of capital 
to be effective and therefore limits financial flexibility of the borrower, this can be a 
problem for financial constrained companies. Aghion and Bolton (1992) suggested 
that financially constrained companies can forgo certain profitable projects. The 
authors predict that as borrowers become more financially constrained, the use of 
performance covenants increases compared to capital covenants (Hypothesis 1). 
The use of performance covenants can be costly because unwarranted control 
transfers open the way to rent seeking. Unwarranted control transfers increase as 
the accounting information of a company doesn’t reflect well the state of nature of it, 
thus they predict that the use of capital covenants increase compared to 
performance covenants as contractibility of accounting information declines. 
(Hypothesis 2)  
In this study the authors distinct two types of mechanisms that can help to avoid the 
conflict of interest that arise in debt contracts, performance covenants and capital 
covenants, both type of covenants match with the classification made by Aghion and 
Bolton (1992): 
a. Performance covenants – they rely on accounting information ratios that are 
formulated in terms of current period performance or efficiency ratios, such 
as interest coverage, debt-to-earnings, EBITDA or Cash Flow, among others. 
Performance covenants act as trip wires, or timely indicators, of present 
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performance of the company, having also the capability of looking forward. 
This is why they are used as a timely indicator of the financial distress of a 
company, helping to achieved contingent control transfers; 
b. Capital covenants - they rely on accounting information that is gotten from 
the balance sheet and gives information about the sources and uses of capital 
within the company. The use of these type of covenants is the best way for 
achieving the alignment ex ante of interest between debtholders’ and 
shareholders’ interest by making shareholders keeping enough capital during 
the life of the debt contract, being effective in reducing the agency cost of 
debt, by making the value of the shares of the company sensitive to the 
decisions of the manager. 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, they estimated 4 models, regressing the proportion of 
performance covenants over the total set of covenants within a debt contract (P/P+C 
or covenant mix) on covenant determinants identified in previous studies such as 
Nach, Netter and Poulsen (2003), Billett, King and Mauer (2007) and Chava and 
Roberts (2008), as control variables in all models and they also use as regressors 
the proxies of financial constrains proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), in the second 
model; Kaplan and Zingales (1997), in the third model; and Clearly (1999), in the 
fourth model (the F-constraint-WW, the F-constraint-KZ and the F-constraint-CL 
respectively)5. 
As it can be seen in table 4, they found that older dividend paying companies and 
the ones with low leverage rely more on capital covenants rather than performance 
covenants. Dividend paying companies (mature companies) are less likely to be 
financially constrained, but, high leveraged companies are expected to be.  
The 3 financial constraints described above exhibits positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, implying that companies rely on performance covenants in 
their covenants packages more as they become more financially constrained. They 
found that high growth companies tend to rely on more performance covenants 
                                                        
5 These measures of financial constrains use different characteristics within companies in order to capture a measurement 
of the financial constrain of the studied company. 
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rather that capital covenants, consistent with the cost of capital constraints 
increasing with high growth opportunities. In contrast with prior studies (they argued 
that these results are due to the lack of distinguish between performance and capital 
covenants) that said that high growth companies face more covenants (Bradley and 
Roberts, 2004) and (Demiroglu and James, 2010) or face fewer covenants (Skinner 
1993). 
Companies with larger portion of tangible assets rely more con capital covenants 
rather than performance covenants, this can be explained that this type of assets 
can help to avoid asset substitution due to their use as collaterals and they are easier 
to monitor via covenants (Skinner, 1993). Capital covenants are more used because 
they ensure the value of the collateral exceeds the minimum required.  




Source: Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), page 90 
They use the Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) probability model in order to get 4 different 
measures of contractibility (C1, C2, C3 and C4), defined as the ability to predict credit 
risk. They also defined another variable TLR (Timely Loss Recognition) as an 
alternative measure of contractibility, which was estimated following a Basu (1997) 
model and getting from it 𝛽3 (as explained in the section 3.1). In order to test 
hypothesis 2 they estimated 5 models, regressing the proportion of performance 
covenants over the total set of covenants within a debt contract (P/P+C or covenant 
mix) on covenant determinants used in the first model, the F-constraint-WW and the 
different contractibility measures (C1 in the first model, C2 in the second one, C3 in 
the third one, C4 in the fourth one and TLR in the last one).   




Source: Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), page 94 
 
They found that the variation in accounting variables explains a great portion of the 
variation in credit ratings, they also found that contractibility proxies exhibit high 
correlation with each other, implying that the ability of both the income statement 
and balance sheet ratios to explain credit risk is closely. C1 and C2 proxies show 
high correlations with timely loss recognition. Correlations between C1 and C4 
(performance covenants) and timely loss recognition are positive and statistically 
significant, implying that performance covenants increases with the contractibility of 
accounting information. All contractible measures are negative correlated with 
capital covenants, suggesting that companies retreat to capital covenants when 
accounting information doesn´t capture the default risk. 
They also found that the percentage of performance covenants over the total 
covenants used in a contract have a positive relationship with contractibility and 
timely loss recognition, this implies that companies rely more on performance 
covenants rather than capital covenants when accounting scores high on 
contractibility. Results suggest that the choice between the 2 groups of covenants is 
given by the trade-off between the constrains the capital structure, limiting financial 
flexibility (performance covenants) and the need of contractible information (capital 
covenants). As both be used in different situations they are not directly substations 
to each other. 
 30 
They concluded that splitting financial covenants into capital and performance 
covenants is central to understand how accounting is used to control agency 
problems. Capital covenants are used to align both parties’ interests by restricting 
the capital structure of the borrower, and performance covenants act as trip wires 
that transfer control to lenders when the borrower’s performance deteriorates, arising 
then a conflict of interest between both of them. 
They found that capital covenants are negatively correlated with performance 
covenants, implying that the choice of both reflects trading-off their costs. Accounting 
information can be used in order to align both parties’ interest and to facilitate state 
contingent control allocation. The use of performance covenants over capital 
covenants increases with the financial constraints of the borrower, consistent with 
the claim that capital structure restrictions are costly for financial constraint 
companies. The use of performance covenants over capital covenants decreases as 
contractibility of accounting information declines. Performance covenants act as trip 
wires but capital covenants don’t, they also found that performance covenants are 
good predictors of future contract renegotiations. 
 
3.3. Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit 
agreements, Roberts, M. and Sufi, A. (2009), Journal of Financial 
Economics 
 
Renegotiation plays an important role in many corporate finance theories. There are 
not many empirical studies that examine renegotiation outside bankruptcy or default 
situations, which have arisen a lot of questions that are still not answered: How often 
are financial contracts renegotiated? What are the primary outcomes of 
renegotiation? What factors trigger renegotiation? And, how is renegotiation related 
to the initial terms of the agreement? 
The authors try to answer these questions by studying the renegotiations observed 
in a sample of 1000 private credit contracts closed from 1995 to 2005 between 
financial institutions (as lenders) and 799 public listed companies (as borrowers) 
located in the USA from different industries, excluding the financial industry. They 
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provide empirical evidence about renegotiation, its core stones and implications in 
financial contracting. This study is also related to previous ones as the authors 
examine why borrowers and lenders agree to include both ex ante and ex post 
contingencies into debt contracts. 
They found that 645 loans were renegotiated before the maturity, 208 matured and 
147 are right censored (95 of them do not have any information and other 52 were 
not renegotiated). They found that debt contracts are modified through a 
renegotiation process, on average, within 538 days after signing the contract (43,6% 
of the total term of the loan). A contract with maturity of at least one year has a 
probability of being renegotiated of over 90%, it increases to 96% if the term of the 
contract is at least 3 years.  
A company might want to renegotiate its debt contract when the covenants within it 
restrict something that the company wants to do, such as entering a merger or 
acquisition, increasing its capital expenditures, changing its financial policies, among 
others. Renegotiations can also be a consequence of macroeconomic factors, for 
example credit market liquidity, financial health of banks and aggregate stock market 
or just due to covenant violation or acting against contingencies included in the 
contract. There are 3 groups of contingencies: 
1. Pricing grids which make the interest rate spread a function of financial ratios or 
credit ratings (73% of the total number of loans studied used this kind of 
contingency); 
2. Borrowing bases, which relates the loan with the value of the collateral, such as 
accounts receivable and inventories (20% of the total number of loans studied 
used this kind of contingency); 
3. Financial covenants, which are specific ratios linked to the financial statements 
that the borrower must comply with. 
The three above can change the terms of debt contract, allocating bargaining power 
to the lender among different states of the world.  
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Renegotiation can be seen as an out-equilibrium phenomenon (Maskin and Moore, 
1999), where parties sign the contract that is pareto optimal for both. When time 
goes on there is a possibility of getting out of the equilibrium, opening the possibility 
that agents tear up the contract and look for a renegotiation. In this sense, 
renegotiations can be seen as a game played by both agents when there is a surplus 
under the initial terms of the contract, after the debt was issued. 
Gromb (1995) creates a model that when having high cash flow, borrower can 
negotiate better conditions in his favour compared to ones in the initial contract. This 
can be extent to credit quality, where better conditions of borrowers’ credit quality 
give him more bargaining power to renegotiate. With increase in his bargaining 
power, the borrower must have other financing options in order to demonstrate a 
real threat to the lender and enforce him to negotiate. Renegotiations can also be 
led by the opposite situation, as the borrower is deteriorating its credit quality, it stops 
being pareto optimal. As the company is experiencing poor performance, covenants 
are being violated (or even without violating them), making the lender to push for a 
compensation due to additional credit risk he bears. 
They estimated a probit model in order to examine the decisions behind 
renegotiating, the model is the following 
𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒) = 𝜙(𝑋𝑙𝑡𝛽) 
Where, 
- 𝜙, is the standard normal cumulative distribution function; 
- X, is a vector of covariates of each loan (l) for each quarter (t); 
- 𝛽, is the unknown parameter vector that is estimated by maximum likelihood. 
All variables were lagged one period relative to the renegotiation indicator (1 if 
renegotiation is observed and 0 otherwise). To be able to capture firms’ 
heteroscedasticity and dependence, they estimate the parameter of covariance 
matrix non-parametrically, as Petersen (2009). To proxy credit quality they used 
book assets as the ability of the firm to collateralize its obligations, debt-to-EBITDA 
and debt-to-book assets as a measure of financial health, market-to-book ratio in 
order to measure future investment opportunities, EBITDA over book assets as a 
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measure of short term liquidity, volatility of EBITDA over book assets in order to 
capture the expectations of future renegotiation and the stock returns of each 
company in order to get the cost of equity (as equity is a competitor of debt in the 
financing of a company). 
They also took macroeconomic factors such as BB-AAA credit spread on public 
traded bonds in order to measure credit market conditions, the leverage of 
commercial banks in the USA as total liabilities over book assets, in order to measure 
the financial sector health, the GDP growth as a measure of productivity and the 
CRSP value-weighted index as a measure of the attractiveness of equity financing. 
In order to capture the evolution of these variables, they got the difference between 
the current value and the value at the time of the origination of the loan. There are 
included control variables as Fama and French 12-industry fixed effects in order to 
measure the structure of syndicate lending, the credit rating fixed effect as a way of 
controlling credit risk variation, the initial terms of the loans, which are introduced as 
the natural logarithm of the stated maturity, the average interest rate, the number of 
participants in the syndicate loan, the proportion of the loan in the book assets, the 
loan time elapsed the presence of any contingency and a time trend in order to 
capture any trend of the data. 
A great portion of the loans studied were negotiated between 25% and 50% of their 
elapsed period until maturity, being renegotiated on average the 57% of the life of 
the contract. They found that renegotiations and their outcomes have a strong 
cyclical component as this is due to the cyclicality in earning and the borrower’s 
credit quality. They found that covenant violation is a strong predictor of borrowers’ 
unfavourable outcomes (17% and 21% of these outcomes were driven by a covenant 
violation the year prior the renegotiation). They claim that as not always a reduction 
in amount size or other “unfavourable” outcomes are driven always by covenant 
violation, there are other explanation to those outcomes: a borrower would like to 
reduce its credit line amount (or increase the interest rate) as he do not need it at all, 
trying to lower the fees he is paying for the amount that is not used, receiving then 
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more concessions as getting an extent in the maturity, a reduce in the collateral of 
the loan or even a relaxation of the contingencies included in the debt contract. 
About the outcomes of renegotiations, they found that maturity changed on average 
776 days (64% of relative change) while loan amounts changed on average US$ 193 
millions (43% of relative change) and interest rates changed on average 64 basic 
points (40% of relative change). The most common outcome in a renegotiation is 
maturity in the first place (57% of the cases), the increase in the loan amount in 
second place (56% of the cases), in third place is the modification in the interest 
rates (over 55% of the cases), and finally 11% of the cases finished in a change of 
lender. 
Table 5: Probit model results, Panel A 
 
Source: Roberts and Sufi (2009), page 173 
The authors highlight that when a company suffers an increasing in its leverage 
levels and a decreasing in profitability, measured as EBITDA over book value of 
assets (it can be seen as the ability of the company to repay its obligations), there is 
an increase of the likelihood of entering a renegotiation, and the opposite is expected 
to happen if there is an increase in the company’s book to market ratio. They also 
found that an increase in the assets of the company, the changes in the equity values, 
changes in the macroeconomic factors, increase the likelihood of entering a 
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renegotiation. GDP growth and aggregate equity market returns have a weaker 
effect in the likelihood of entering a renegotiation. 
Table 5: Probit model results, Panel B 
 
Source: Roberts and Sufi (2009), page 174 
They suggest that long maturity loans and loans that rely on cash flow covenants 
are more likely to be renegotiated. The presence of pricing grids or borrowing bases 
do not make a renegotiation less likely and the presence of borrowing bases predicts 
renegotiations as it is correlated with the changes in ex post company’s 
characteristics. Other ex-ante contingencies do not have strong prediction in 
renegotiation. 
They conclude that contingencies allocate bargaining power by altering the default 
option. When a company experience a decrease in its cash flows and its debt 
contract does not include any price grid on cash flows, it is going to be in a better 
position than the one agreed in the initial terms. In this case, the lender would like to 
renegotiate these terms in order to get a correct compensation due to the higher risk 
that it is bearing. On the other hand, if the debt contract includes a pricing grid on 
cash flows, as there is a deterioration of the cash flows, the pricing grid is making 
the interest rate going up, allocating then bargaining power to the lender and giving 





After going through all papers, their statistics and surveys we can say that with way 
deeper understanding we can talk about given topic. Having knowledge about variety 
of covenants and accounting conservatism helps us understand, in depth, how 
contracts are made and why covenants are included. In order to be able to 
understand the topic and to have comprehensive knowledge about it we had to make 
distinction between The Agency theory and The Incomplete contract theory. This 
being said, one has to understand how important is to differ limitations of both and 
main difference between them. One, as already mentioned, forbids managers to take 
certain actions while other shifts controlling rights to one with the right incentives. 
They are able to do it because of various covenants included in the deal and they 
differ among themselves as well.  
Accounting-based covenants can be used in order to align both parties’ interest by 
making the borrower keeping certain amount capital, which makes the borrower has 
“skin in the game” (capital covenants). They also facilitate state contingent control 
allocation, by allocating bargaining power when the borrower’s performance 
deteriorates (performance covenants), giving incentives to the borrower to 
renegotiate the initial terms of the debt contract modifying them according to the 
borrower’s real state of nature. It makes the scope of borrower’s opportunistic 
behaviour decrease. 
To be sure that covenants will be triggered on time, they need support of 
conservatism in the books. Conservatism allows them to spot potential red flags as 
soon as possible and that way prevent any potential losses. Conservatism and debt 
covenants complement each other and help to reduce the agency problems 
(Nikolaev, 2010). Else ways if that is not enough to keep up to the deal and at some 
point there is a break of some covenants there is a way of incurring ex-post efficiency 
through different ways. One way we considered important is being able to 
renegotiate, and how it supports both ex-ante and ex- post efficiency. 
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Saying this we have to be aware that neither of theories is sufficient or complete. 
There is a lot of research in progress and there are still some questions unanswered: 
what are the ex-ante and ex-post efficiency implications of renegotiation? (Roberts 
and Sufi, 2009), how large are the benefits of using accounting-based information in 
debt contracting? is it possible to design any accounting rules in order to make easier 
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